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Abstract
If agents are able to exploit the resources available in a multi-agent domain they must make
use of other agents to help them in their tasks. In order to do this it is important that we first of all
have an understanding of agency, and then of how goals are generated and subsequently adopted
by other agents. In this paper we build upon a three-tiered hierarchy which has been constructed
to define objects, agents and autonomous agents, where all autonomous agents are agents, and all
agents are objects. In this hierarchy, agents are viewed as objects with goals, and autonomous
agents as agents with motivations. Any object may be viewed as an agent if is currently being
engaged to some use, and any agent as autonomous if it has the ability to generate its own goals.
This view of agency and autonomy is thus based on the generation and transfer of goals between
various entities in the world. Specifically, an entity is an agent if it can be viewed as satisfying a
goal. This goal must first be created and then, if necessary and appropriate, transferred to another
entity. It is this adoption of goals that makes an entity change from an object to an agent, and it is
the self-generation of goals that defines the autonomy of an agent. We consider the three classes
of goal adoption by objects, agents and autonomous agents. The first of these is merely a question
of instantiation, the second requires an understanding of the relationship of the agent to the other
entities that are engaging it, and the third amounts to a question of negotiation or persuasion. In
this paper we specify and describe goal generation and adoption in the context of hierarchical
agent models using the Z specification language.
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1 Introduction
There are many definitions of agents[5, 6]. A recent paper by Wooldridge and Jennings [9] quotes
the definition of an agent as “one who, or that which, exerts power or produces an effect.”1 However,
they omitted the second sense of agent which is given as “one who acts for another : : :” This is
important, for it is not the acting alone that defines agency, but the acting for someone or something
that is defining. A cup, for example, is an object. We can regard it as an agent, but it serves no useful
purpose to do so without considering the circumstances. A cup is an agent if it is containing a liquid
and it is doing so to some end. In other words, if I fill a cup with coffee, then the cup is my agent — it
serves my purpose. It would not be an agent if it was just sitting on a table without serving any useful
purpose. In this case it would be an object. Note that we do not require an entity to be intelligent for
it to be an agent.
1Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (7th edition), Oxford University Press.
This view of agency is based on the generation and transfer of goals between entities. Specifically,
an entity is an agent if it can be viewed as satisfying a goal. This goal must first be created and then,
if necessary and appropriate, transferred to another entity. It is this adoption of goals that makes
an entity change from an object to an agent, and it is the self-generation of goals that is responsible
for the autonomy of an agent. In this paper we specify and describe goal generation and adoption
in the context of hierarchical agent models using the Z specification language. We begin by briefly
outlining Luck and d’Inverno’s framework for agency and autonomy based on a three-tiered hierarchy
of objects, agents and autonomous agents[2]. We describe each of these entities, and show why
and how the distinctions between them are both important and useful. Then we describe the role of
motivations in goal generation, and finally consider goal adoption and discuss how it helps us (and
other agents) to understand interactions in a multi-agent environment.
2 The Agent Hierarchy Framework
The Agent Hierarchy Framework consists of objects, agents and autonomous agents. The basic idea
underlying this hierarchy is that all known entities are objects. Of this set of objects, some are agents,
and of these agents some are autonomous agents.
Before we can move to a definition of any of these entities, we must first define two primitives the first
of these being an attribute. Attributes are simply features of the world, and are the only characteristics
which are manifest. They need not be perceived by any particular entity, but must be potentially
perceivable in an omniscient sense. (The notion of a feature here allows anything to be included.)
The second primitive is an action which is strongly related to the notion of agency.
Definition: An attribute is a perceivable feature.
Definition: An action is a discrete event which changes the state of the environment.
In Z, before constructing a specification, we must first define types. Here we define the set of all
attributes and actions:
[Attribute;Action]
An object is then defined in terms of its abilities and its attributes with no further defining character-
istics. This provides us with the basic building block to develop our notion of agency.
Definition: An object comprises a set of actions and a set of attributes.
A state schema can be constructed that defines an object. Z schemas have two parts: the upper,
declarative, part which declares variables and their types, and the lower, predicate, part which relates
and constrains the variables.
Object
attributes : Attribute; capableof : Action
An object is an agent if it serves a useful purpose either to a different agent, or to itself, in which
case the agent is autonomous. Specifically, an agent is something that ‘adopts’ or satisfies a goal or
set of goals (often of another). Thus if I want to store coffee in a cup, then the cup is my agent for
storing coffee. It is satisfying, or has been ascribed, or has adopted my goal, to have the coffee stored.
An agent is thus defined in relation to its goals. We take a traditional view of goals as describable
environmental states.
Definition: A goal is a state of affairs to be achieved in the environment.
Goal == Attribute
Definition: An agent is an instantiation of an object with an associated set of goals.
Agent
Object
goals : Goal
Thus an agent has, or is ascribed, a set of goals which it retains over any instantiation (or lifetime).
One object may give rise to different instantiations of agents. An agent is instantiated from an object
in response to another agent. Thus agency is transient, and an object which becomes an agent at some
time may subsequently revert to being an object.
Returning to the cup example, we have an agent with the same attributes and actions as the cup object,
but now it can be ascribed the goal — my goal — of storing my coffee. Not everyone will know
that it is an agent in this way, however. If, for example, I am in a cafe and there is a half-full cup of
lemon-tea on my table, there are several views that can be taken. It can be regarded by the waiter as
an agent for me, storing my tea, or it can be regarded as an object serving no purpose if the waiter
thinks it is not mine. The view of the cup as an object or agent is relevant to whether the waiter will
remove the cup or leave it at the table. Note that we are not suggesting that the cup actually possesses
a goal, just that there is a goal that it is satisfying.
Consider a robot. If the robot has no goal then it cannot use its actuators in any sensible way but only,
perhaps, in a random way, and must be considered an object. Alternatively, if the robot has some goal
which allows it to employ its actuators in some directed way, such as picking up a cup, or riveting
a panel onto a hull, then it is an agent. The goal need not be explicitly represented, but can instead
be implicit in the hardware or software design of the robot. Note that the coffee-cup is passive and
has goals imposed upon and ascribed to it, while the robot is capable of actively manipulating the
environment by performing actions designed to satisfy its goals.
This definition of agency relies upon the existence of other agents which provide goals that are adopted
in order to instantiate an agent. These agents are autonomous agents since they are not dependent
on the goals of others. Autonomous agents possess goals which are generated from within, rather
than adopted from, other agents. These goals are generated from motivations which are higher-level
non-derivative components characterising the nature of the agent, but which are related to goals.
Motivations are, however, qualitatively different from goals in that they are not describable states of
affairs in the environment. For example, consider the motivation greed. This does not specify a state
of affairs to be achieved, nor is it describable in terms of the environment, but it may give rise to the
generation of a goal to rob a bank. The distinction between the motivation of greed and the goal of
robbing a bank is clear, with the former providing a reason to do the latter, and the latter specifying
what must be done.
Definition: A motivation is any desire or preference that can lead to the generation and adoption of
goals and which affects the outcome of the reasoning or behavioural task intended to satisfy those
goals. (This draws on the definition used by Kunda [1].)
[Motivation]
Definition: An autonomous agent is an instantiation of an agent together with an associated set of
motivations.
AutonomousAgent
Agent
motivations : Motivation
An autonomous agent with motivations, therefore, has some means of evaluating behaviour in terms
of the environment and these motivations, so that its behaviour is determined by both external and
internal factors.
In illustration of these ideas, note that the cup cannot be considered autonomous because it cannot
generate its own goals. The robot, however, is potentially autonomous in the sense that it may have
a mechanism for internal goal generation. Suppose the robot has motivations of achievement, hunger
and self-preservation, where achievement is defined in terms of fixing tyres onto a car on a production
line, hunger in terms of maintaining power levels, and self-preservation in terms of avoiding system
breakdowns. Normally, the robot will generate goals to attach tyres to cars through a series of
subgoals. With low power levels, however, it may replace this with a newly-generated goal of its
batteries. A third possibility is that in satisfying its achievement motivation, it works for too long and
is in danger of overheating. In this case, the robot can generate a goal of pausing for a period to avoid
any damage to its components. Such a robot is autonomous because its goals are not imposed, but are
generated in response to its environment.
Thus, we have constructed a formal specification which identifies and characterises those entities that
are called agents and autonomous agents. Most usefully, perhaps, the specification is constructed in
such a way as to allow further levels of specification to be added to describe particular agent designs
and architectures.
3 Goal Generation
The three-tiered framework described above involves the generation of goals from motivations in
an autonomous agent, and the adoption of goals by, and in order to create, other agents. In this
section, we consider issues in goal generation that must occur before goal adoption can take place.
Specifically, we describe how an autonomous agent, defined in terms of its high-level and somewhat
abstract motivations, can construct goals or concrete states of affairs to be achieved in the environment.
We extend the framework in this way and add more detail by introducing new schemas that specify
the relevant aspects.
Our model requires a repository of known goals which capture knowledge of limited and well-defined
aspects of the world. These goals describe particular states or sub-states of the world with each
autonomous agent having its own such repository. An agent will try to find a way to mitigate
motivations, either by selecting an action to achieve an existing goal, or by retrieving a goal from a
repository of known goals. The last of these is considered below.
In order to retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, an autonomous agent must have some way of
assessing the effects of competing or alternative goals. Clearly, the goals which make the greatest
positive contribution to the motivations of the agent should be selected. The GenerateGoal schema
below describes how an autonomous agent monitors its motivations for goal generation. First, the agent
changes given by4AutonomousAgent . The variable representing the repository of available known
goals, goalbase is declared. Then, the motivational effect on an autonomous agent of satisfying a set
of new goals is given. Themotiveect function returns a numeric value representing the motivational
effect of satisfying a set of goals with a particular configuration of motivations and a set of existing
goals. The predicate part specifies that all goals previously and currently being pursued must be
known goals that already exist in the goalbase. The remaining part of the schema states that there is a
set of goals in the goalbase that has a greater motivational effect than any other set of goals, and the
current goals of the agent are updated to include the new goals.
GenerateGoal
4AutonomousAgent
goalbase : Goal
motiveect : Motivation"Goal"Goal"
goals  goalbase ^ goals
0
 goalbase
9 gs : Goal j gs  goalbase  (8 os : Goal j os 2 ( goalbase) 
(motiveect motivations goals gs  motiveect motivations goals os)
^ goals
0
= goals [ gs)
4 Goal Adoption
Since we are interested in multi-agent worlds, we must consider the world as a whole rather than just
individual agents. In this world, all autonomous agents are agents and all agents are objects. We also
identify further sub-categories of entity. Before proceeding, therefore, we distinguish those objects
which are not agents, and those agents which are not autonomous and refer to them as neutral-objects
and server-agents respectively.
An agent is then either a server-agent or an autonomous agent, and an object is either a neutral-object
or an agent.
NeutralObject
Object
goals = fg
ServerAgent
Agent
motivations = fg
We can then describe the world as a collection of neutral objects, server agents and autonomous
agents.
World
autoagents : AutonomousAgent
neutralobjects : NeutralObject
serveragents : ServerAgent
In the description given in the previous section, goals may be generated only by autonomous agents.
Both non-autonomous (server) nd autonomous agents, however, can adopt goals. With autonomous
agents, goal adoption amounts to a problem of negotiation or persuasion, requiring an analysis of
the target autonomous agent. With non-autonomous agents, goal adoption requires an analysis of
both the agent intended to adopt the goal, and any other agent engaging that agent. With objects, no
analysis is required, since agents are created from objects with the relevant associated goals.
For explication we distinguish three kinds of agent. A target agent or object is one that is intended
to adopt goals. An engaging agent is one whose goals are currently (already) adopted by the target
agent. A viewing agent is an agent that seeks to engage a target agent or object by having it adopt
goals. It is a viewing agent because the way in which goal adoption is attempted is determined by
its view of the situation. We consider the three cases of goal adoption by continuing with examples
involving cups. These examples could also have used robots, but cups demonstrate that the model
applies equally to entities with no intelligence, or with unknown intelligence.
In the simplest case, goal adoption by non-autonomous agents occurs by instantiating an agent from a
neutral object with the goals to be adopted. In this case, no agent exists before the goals are adopted,
but the act of goal transfer causes an agent to be created from a neutral object using those particular
goals. Thus, for example, the cup on my desk, which is just an object, becomes an agent when I use
it for storing my coffee, when it adopts or is ascribed my goal of storing coffee. It is only possible to
create the agent from the object because the cup is not being used by anyone else — it is not engaged
by another agent. An entity can only be a neutral object if it is not engaged. Below we specify a
function that creates a server-agent by ascribing a set of goals to some existing neutral-object.
ObjectAdoptGoals : (NeutralObject  Goal) ServerAgent
8 gs : Goal ; old : NeutralObject ; new : ServerAgent 
ObjectAdoptGoals(old ; gs) = new , new :goals = old :goals [ gs
^ new :capableof = old :capableof ^ new :attributes = old :attributes
We now specify how a non-autonomous disengaged object, or neutral-object is instantiated as a
(server) agent. In Z, a variable with a ‘?’ indicates an input. Thus, an object and a set of goals are
input, the entities in the world change, indicated by 4World , and the sets of objects and agents are
updated accordingly.
ObjectAdoptGoalsWorld
o? : NeutralObject ; gs? : Goal
4World
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects n fo?g
serveragents
0
= serveragents [ fObjectAdoptGoals (o?; gs?)g
autoagents
0
= autoagents
If the cup was engaged by another (possibly non-autonomous) agent, then it is itself an agent, and
the protocol for goal adoption changes. In this case, there are alternative ways for me to engage the
cup. The first of these involves me trying to persuade the engaging agent to release the cup so that
I may then subsequently engage it for my purposes. This relates to the issues of goal adoption for
autonomous agents which are considered later. The second involves supplying the agent with more
goals, so that the agent is shared between different engaging agents. The third possibility involves
displacing the engaging agent so that I become the engaging agent and ascribe to the cup my own
goals. For example, the cup may currently be used as a paper-weight for my office-mate, and is
therefore her agent with her goal of securing loose papers. I can displace the goal ascribed to the
cup by removing the cup and pouring my coffee into it. Now the cup is ascribed my goal of storing
coffee, and it has switched from one agent to another. In fact, this is equivalent to the agent reverting
to an object and then being re-instantiated as a new agent. This method may not be an appropriate
strategy, however, because in destroying the agency of the cup as a paper-weight, I risk a conflict
with the existing engaging agent, my office-mate. It would be better for me to negotiate first, to
obtain permission to destroy the original agency. Our notion of agency thus contributes to a better
understanding of the world, regardless of whether we are concerned with cups or robots, since the
only important difference between them is their functionality through their agency. The mathematical
formalism of this operation is similar to that of the previous schema.
With autonomous agents, goals must explicitly be adopted, as opposed to an implicit ascription of
goals for non-autonomous agents. This may be more difficult than the previous case, since it requires
some form of negotiation. Autonomous agents are motivated agents and will only participate in an
activity and assist another agent if it is to their motivational advantage to do so. In the schema below
we merely have that the set of new goals which the agent adopts are the best that it can find in its
goalbase at that time. It makes use of the function AutonomousAgentAdoptGoals which adds gs?
to the existing goals of the agent.
AutonomousAgentAdoptGoalsWorld
aa? : AutonomousAgent ; gs? : Goal
4World
autoagents
0
= autoagents n faa?g [ fAutonomousAgentAdoptGoals (aa?; gs?)g
serveragents
0
= serveragents
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects
: (9 hs : Goal j hs  goalbase ^ hs 6= gs? 
motiveect motivations goals hs > motiveect motivations goals gs?)
Though we have not specified the way in which motivations change in response to the environment,
nor how agents negotiate to achieve desired goal adoption in other agents, we have shown how these
notions of agency and autonomy can be used to provide a structure that allows a better understanding
of the entities in the world so that negotiation can be effective and efficient.
5 Conclusions
The notion of motivation is not new. Simon, for example, takes motivation to be “that which controls
attention at any given time,” [7]. Sloman [8] has elaborated on Simon’s work, showing how motivations
are relevant to emotions and the development of a computational theory of mind. Others have used
motivation and related notions in developing computational architectures for autonomous agents such
as the motives of Norman and Long [4], and the concerns of Moffat and Frijda [3]. What is new about
the current work is the role of motivation in defining autonomy.
The three-tiered hierarchy distinguishes clearly between objects, agents and autonomous agents in
terms of goals and motivations. Such an analysis of the entities in the world not only provides
appropriate structures so that different levels of functionality may be established, but also information
as to how multiple entities or agents can cooperate to solve problems which could not be solved
alone. By basing the distinctions on function and purpose, we do not arbitrarily differentiate between
cups and robots, for example, especially when it is not useful to do so. Instead, our motivation and
goal based analysis allows us to concentrate precisely on important aspects of multi-agent interaction
and problem-solving. In that context, we have considered the roles of goal generation and adoption.
We have specified how and why goals must be generated in some autonomous agents in response
to motivations, grounding chains of goal adoption, and further, how goals are adopted by objects,
agents and autonomous agents in the hierarchical agent model. This specification thus outlines what
is necessary for effective multi-agent systems.
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